Statistical Methods III: Spring 2013

Jonathan Wand

Stanford University

RDD + applications

Outline

RDD – motivation

2 RDD – theory

3 Application: Lee/Caughey-Sekhon

- Lee
- Caughey-Sekhon
- Why difference

4 Concluding comments

Incumbency advantage

Question: Does incumbency provide an electoral advantage?

Regression approach (e.g., Gelman-King)

 $\mathbb{E}[V_{t+1}] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_t + \beta_2 (P_t \times R_{t+1}) + \beta_3 V_t,$

- $V_t \in [0, 1]$ is the *Dem Share* in election *t*
- $P_t \in \{-1, 1\}$ is the *Winning Party* in election *t*
- $R_{t+1} \in \{0, 1\}$ indicates whether *Incumbent Runs* in election t + 1

Q: which parameter is "incumbency advantage"? What are the possible threats to inference?

- strategic exit (decision of Incumbents)
- strategic entry (decision of Challengers)
- selection effect of elections (better candidates win)

Q: which of these are "corrected" by regression?

Jonathan Wand (Stanford University)

Question: Does incumbency provide an electoral advantage?

Quasi experimental approach (e.g., RDD, Lee 2008)

 $\Delta = E[Y_{t+1} | \text{ won with 50 perc}] = E[Y_{t+1} | \text{ lost with 50 perc.}]$

At t + 1, compare vote share of *party* which just won at time t, with those that just lost at t.

RDD – election discontinuity





Which problem are same, which are different from regression?

- strategic exit (decision of Incumbents)?
- strategic entry (decision of Challengers)?
- selection effect of elections (better candidates win)?

RDD: notation

Let

- Z is a continuous variable, termed "forcing" variable: along which discontinuity occurs e.g., vote share, GRE score
- *c* deterministic and exogenously given threshold for discontinutity e.g., 50%+1 (majority, plurality can also work); 790=scholarship.

RDD: Assignment mechanism

 Sharp design: assignment is determistic function of known, common cutpoint *c* and value of Z_i

$$D_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } Z_i \ge c \\ 0 & \text{if } Z_i < c \end{cases}$$

 Fuzzy design: assignment probabilistic function of known, common cutpoint *c* and value of Z_i

$$\lim_{z\downarrow c} P(D_i = 1) \neq \lim_{z\uparrow c} P(D_i = 1)$$

• Potential outcome is function of both Z_i and potentially D_i

$$Y_i(0) = \mu_0(Z_i) + \epsilon_{0i}$$

$$Y_i(1) = \mu_1(Z_i) + \epsilon_{1i}$$

RDD: Parameter

Treatment at discontinuity (TAD)

$$TAD = E[Y_i(1) | D_i = 1, Z_i = c] - E[Y_i(0) | D_i = 1, Z_i = c]$$

NOTE:

- again, we do not observe $Y_i(0)$ and $Y_i(1)$,
- because at *c* we do observe $Y_i(0)$ (sharp RDD)

Study limits approaching each side of the threshold

$$\Delta_{RD} = \lim_{z \downarrow c} E[Y_i \mid Z_i = z] - \lim_{z \uparrow c} E[Y_i \mid Z_i = z]$$

Under what conditions is TAD identified at limit?

RDD: Sources of bias

$$\Delta_{RD} = \lim_{z \downarrow c} E[Y_i \mid Z_i = z] - \lim_{z \uparrow c} E[Y_i \mid Z_i = z] + E[Y_i(1) \mid D_i = 1, Z_i = c] - E[Y_i(1) \mid D_i = 1, Z_i = c] + E[Y_i(0) \mid D_i = 1, Z_i = c] - E[Y_i(0) \mid D_i = 1, Z_i = c] + E[Y_i(0) \mid D_i = 0, Z_i = c] - E[Y_i(0) \mid D_i = 0, Z_i = c]$$

$$= E[Y_{i}(1) | D_{i} = 1, Z_{i} = c] - E[Y_{i}(0) | D_{i} = 1, Z_{i} = c] + E[Y_{i}(0) | D_{i} = 1, Z_{i} = c] - E[Y_{i}(0) | D_{i} = 0, Z_{i} = c] + \lim_{z \downarrow c} E[Y_{i} | Z_{i} = z] - E[Y_{i}(1) | D_{i} = 1, Z_{i} = c] + E[Y_{i}(0) | D_{i} = 0, Z_{i} = c] - \lim_{z \uparrow c} E[Y_{i} | Z_{i} = z]$$

RDD: Sources of bias

0
$$E[Y_i(0) | D_i = 1, Z_i = c] - E[Y_i(0) | D_i = 0, Z_i = c]$$

selection bias: can indviduals control which side they are on? randomization would makes this zero

2
$$\lim_{z \downarrow c} E[Y_i \mid Z_i = z] - E[Y_i(1) \mid D_i = 1, Z_i = c]$$

gap approaching limit, from above: continuity in $\mu_1(Z_i)$ would make this zero

3
$$E[Y_i(0) | D_i = 0, Z_i = c] - \lim_{z \uparrow c} E[Y_i | Z_i = z]$$

gap approaching limit, from below: continuity in $\mu_0(Z_i)$ would make this zero

RDD: Assumptions

Let there be a known, fixed z = c such that (1) discontinuity in treatment assignment

$$\lim_{z\downarrow c^+} \Pr(D=1 \mid Z=z) \neq \lim_{z\uparrow c^-} \Pr(D=1 \mid Z=z)$$

(2) continuity in potential outcomes

$$\lim_{z\downarrow c^+} \Pr(Y_j \le r \mid Z = z) = \lim_{z\uparrow c^-} \Pr(Y_j \le r \mid Z = z) \quad (j = 0, 1)$$

(3) Continuity in other covariates, possible confounders

$$\lim_{z\downarrow c^+} \Pr(X_j \le r \mid Z = z) = \lim_{z\uparrow c^-} \Pr(X_j \le r \mid Z = z) \quad (j = 0, 1)$$

there are no jumps at the treatment threshold c

RDD: Assumptions

Let there be a known, fixed z = c such that

(1.b) discontinuity in treatment assignment, sharp design

$$\lim_{z\downarrow c^+} \Pr(D=1 \mid Z=z) = 1$$

$$\lim_{z\uparrow c^-} \Pr(D=1\mid Z=z)=0$$

Meaning: individual receives treatment iff observed covariate Z_i crosses known threshold c

(2.b) continuity in expectation of potential outcomes

$$\lim_{z\downarrow c^+} E(Y_j \mid Z=z) = \lim_{z\uparrow c^-} E(Y_j \mid Z=z) \quad (j=0,1)$$

(3.b) Continuity in expectation of covariates

$$\lim_{z\downarrow c^+} E(X_j \mid Z=z) = \lim_{z\uparrow c^-} E(X_j \mid Z=z) \quad (j=0,1)$$

Q: what does this imply about comparison of X on either side of c?

RDD – placebo test, balance test



RDD: homogeneous treatment effects, sharp RDD

Assume (1.b) and (2.b), and $\tau = Y_1 - Y_0$, such that,

$$Y_i = \tau D_i + Y_{0i}$$

Using assumptions (1.a)-(1.c) and homogenous effect model, let's prove that

$$\Delta_{RD} = \lim_{z \downarrow c^+} E[Y|Z = z] - \lim_{z \uparrow c^-} E[Y|Z = z]$$
$$= \tau$$
$$= E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Z = c]$$

RDD: homogeneous treatment effects, sharp RDD Let $\epsilon > 0$, and consider, by (2.b, continuity) and homogeneity,

$$Y^{+} = \lim_{z \downarrow c^{+}} E[Y|Z = z] = \lim_{\epsilon \downarrow 0} E[Y_{i}(1)|Z_{i} = c + \epsilon]$$
$$= \lim_{\epsilon \downarrow 0} E[Y_{i}(0) + \tau |Z_{i} = c + \epsilon]$$
$$= \tau + \lim_{\epsilon \downarrow 0} E[Y_{i}(0)|Z_{i} = c + \epsilon]$$
$$= \tau + E[Y_{i}(0)|Z_{i} = c]$$

and

$$Y^{-} = \lim_{z \uparrow c^{-}} E[Y|Z = z] = \lim_{\epsilon \uparrow 0} E[Y_{i}(0)|Z_{i} = c - \epsilon]$$
$$= E[Y_{i}(0)|Z_{i} = c]$$

So,

$$Y^+ - Y^- = \tau = E[Y(1) - Y(0)|Z = c]$$

RDD: heterogeneous treatment effects Assume (1.b) and (2.b), suppose $\tau_i = Y_{1i} - Y_{0i}$

Theorem
$$E[\tau_i | Z_i = c] = Y^+ - Y^-$$

Proof

$$\lim_{\epsilon \downarrow 0} E[Y_i | Z_i = c + \epsilon_i] = \lim_{\epsilon \downarrow 0} E[Y_i(0) + \tau_i | Z_i = c + \epsilon_i]$$
$$= E[\tau_i | Z_i = c] + E[Y_i(0) | Z_i = c]$$

$$egin{aligned} &\lim_{\epsilon \uparrow 0} E[Y_i | Z_i = c + \epsilon_i] = \lim_{\epsilon \uparrow 0} E[Y_i(0) | Z_i = c + \epsilon_i] \ &= E[Y_i(0) | Z_i = c] \end{aligned}$$

 $Y^{+} - Y^{-} = E[\tau_{i}|Z_{i} = c] + E[Y_{i}(0)|Z_{i} = c] - E[Y_{i}(0)|Z_{i} = c] = E[\tau_{i}|Z_{i} = c]$

RDD: homogeneous treatment effects, fuzzy

Under fuzzy, can solve for

$$\tau = \frac{\lim_{z \downarrow c^+} E(Y|Z=z) - \lim_{z \uparrow c^-} E(Y|Z=z)}{\lim_{z \downarrow c^+} E(D_i|Z=z) - \lim_{z \uparrow c^-} E(D_i|Z=z)}$$

Q: What do you call this estimator? Q: Where have you seen it before?

Simplifies under sharp

$$\tau = \lim_{z \downarrow c^+} E(Y|Z=z) - \lim_{z \uparrow c^-} E(Y|Z=z)$$

Q: How/why?

RDD: Estimation

Consider

$$Y^{+} = \lim_{z \downarrow c} E[Y_i \mid Z_i = z]$$
$$Y^{-} = \lim_{z \uparrow c} E[Y_i \mid Z_i = z]$$

Can we estimate these quantities?

What would we need?

- Do we have enough (or any) data at the limit for c?
- At the limit can we observe both D = 1 and D = 0?

RDD: Estimation

Estimator, for some δ that *you* choose

$$Y^+ = rac{\sum_{i=1}^n Y_i \cdot \mathbf{1}(Z_i \in [\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{c}+\delta])}{\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}(Z_i \in [\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{c}+\delta])}$$

$$Y^+ = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n Y_i \cdot \mathbf{1}(Z_i \in [c, c+\delta])}{\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}(Z_i \in [c, c+\delta])}$$

RDD

Hahn, Todd, deKlaauw (2001)

- treatment assignment insufficient to identify TAD
- proved need for continuity restrictions
- but hard to adjudicate / unclear behavioral implications/assumptions

Lee (2007)

- key is that location of Z around threshold smoothly probabilistic
- no one near threshold can "control" precisely which side of c they are on

RDD: Lee

Let V = Z - c be the observable forcing variable

- Condition (2b) V_i must be drawn from distribution that is sufficiently smooth specifically, F(v|w) is continuously differentiable at v = 0
- V can be a function of (unobserved) type/effort W
- V can be correlated with potential outcomes
- assignment

 $D_i = \mathbf{1}(V_i \geq 0)$

What does continuity of V give?

- probability of being just above/below c the same
- people can't pile up on one side of c
- same distribution of characteristics on either side of c

RDD: difficulties

- selection / manipulation of forcing vairable
 - Can someone stop/force which side they are on
 - Do we change who is around the cutpoint individuals fighting to get over cutpoint?

May be able to test for both of these; only the latter is problematic

- estimation / functional form
 - Is there enough data near cutpoint?
 - To what extent do results change as a function of model choice
- specificity: context / localness
 - Is TAD really of interest?
 - To what extent does TAD describe potential effects elsewhere on Z

RDD: Lee (2008) vote share, t+1



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Democratic Margin in Close Elections at t



Democratic Margin (%)

Broken Down by Incumbent Party at t

Democrat-Held Seats



Broken Down by Incumbent Party at t

40 -36 34 30 -28 27 27 24 23 23 21 21 19 20 -18 18 16 16 14 10 -0 – -2 0 2 4 -4

Republican–Held Seats

Democratic Margin (%)

Incumbent Party's Margin in Close Elections at t



Incumbent Party Margin (%)





Covariate Balance



Covariate Balance



National Partisan Swings

- Partisan swings are imbalanced:
 - 1958 (pro-Democratic tide): all 6 close elections occurred in Republican-held seats
 - 1994 (pro-Republican tide): all 5 close elections occurred in Democratic-held seats
 - Close elections do not generally occur in 50/50 districts

There is Strategic Exit

Strategic exit among incumbents

- 20% who barely win retire prior to next election
- but *all* candidates who barely won first election ran for reelection
- Change over time:
 - 1994: less evidence of strategic exit, lots of strategic entry
 - 2006: 18 Republican open seats versus 9 Democratic open seats
 - 2010: In non-safe seats, 6 Republicans retired, but 15 Democrats retired



RDD: practical suggestions



- Estimate using (flexible) linear regression in small bandwidth
- Check robustness of assumptions